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A Fox News poll shows capitalism holds a 23-point favorability edge over socialism, yet 75% of voters say the economy is not so good or poor.

On the eve of Donald Trump’s return to the presidency of the United States, in January 2025, Meta’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, announced that changes would be made to his company’s moderation policies in the name of “freedom of expression”, which, he said, was under threat by global pressures for what he saw as censorship. The announcement signaled a rapprochement between Meta and the far right around a common goal: the deregulation of Big Tech. Since then, growing entanglement between major technology companies and the U.S. President Donald Trump administration has shown how the private interests of a small group can override the public interest. In recent months, allegations have been mounting that Big Tech companies, especially Meta, have been interfering in the Brazilian electoral process this year, aiming to undermine the reelection of President Lula (PT). This kind of accusation is not new. Over the past decade, a vast body of literature has exposed the mediating role played by digital platforms in foreign interference in elections around the world . These reports have also highlight the challenges of holding companies accountable for allowing these interference campaigns to be amplified. At our research group, NetLab UFRJ , we have spent years investigating how major digital platforms shape public debate and influence people’s perceptions of reality, often outside the regulatory and normative frameworks in force in Brazil. Meta in particular has become fertile ground for disinformation and boosting fraudulent ads, which already account for 10% of its annual revenue . Despite lawsuits and administrative actions brought by Brazilian authorities against Meta, complaints and requests from civil society for investigations , as well as reports published by the press , the company has shown neither the willingness nor the diligence needed to effectively fight this kind of content. Given this troubling track record, NetLab UFRJ created the “Big Tech Observatory” during the 2026 election campaign period in order to monitor how Meta and other digital platforms performed in two key areas: algorithmic recommendation and political advertising. The initiative set out to examine whether these companies would comply with the current Brazilian legislation established by the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE). The results of the analyses, however, told a predictable story. We found that, between July and September, Meta received approximately R$ 2 million (US$ 400,000) for running 1,613 ads placed from outside Brazil that aimed to either favor or harm candidates. All were paid for in foreign currencies and boosted by pages with declared locations in other countries. The amount invested in this advertising is equivalent to that spent on prominent campaigns, including the race for Presidency and other executive offices. Brazilian electoral law expressly prohibits candidates from receiving cash or donations in-kind from abroad. This ban, however, did not prevent the ads from being displayed to Brazilian users of Meta’s platforms. According to the available information, not only the ads were allowed to circulate but they may have reached up to 171 million views in the country. But the irregularities in advertising do not stop there. Brazilian electoral rules prohibit electoral advertising from 48 hours before the polls to 24 hours afterwards. However, our analyses of both rounds of the 2026 election identified hundreds of ads in favor or against specific candidates that circulated on Meta’s platforms with no apparent restrictions. The company even allowed fake profiles posing as official channels of the Electoral Supreme Court to boost disinformation about a supposed “digital vote” which stated that people would be allowed to cast their vote from home on the day of the first round — something which does not exist in the Brazilian electoral system. In addition to these irregularities, Lula’s political campaign page was temporarily disabled by Meta without explanation, preventing it from running electoral ads. On September 23, his Worker´s Party (PT) reported they had been blocked from advertising on Meta’s platforms. In a statement released on October 16 , the company rejected the accusations of election interference and attributed the temporary deactivation to an “incorrect anti-fraud review” carried out under an agreement with the federal government to fight fraud involving public programs. The effectiveness of the company’s anti-fraud measures, however, is questionable: an analysis carried out by NetLab UFRJ identified hundreds of fraudulent ads involving federal public policies circulating before and after September 23, indicating that those same measures were not able to stop this kind of content from running during the same period. Finally, we found signs of discriminatory practices in ad pricing. Based on data released by Meta, we estimate that for the first round Lula’s campaign may have paid between 33% and 43% more than his far right adversary Flávio Bolsonaro campaign to reach the same number of users on Meta’s platforms. Despite this substantial difference, limitations in the company’s transparency policies make it impossible to identify precisely which parameters and criteria are used to price ads and, consequently, to draw definitive conclusions about the mechanisms behind this disparity. Even so, studies conducted in other contexts, such as the United States , India and the Netherlands , also point to evidence of discriminatory pricing practices in the platform’s advertising. Other complaints made during the elections add to this overall scenario of negligence and show that, despite being worth billions and their strategic position at the forefront of technological innovation, major digital platforms invest little in protecting their users. For example, this 2026 election in Brazil saw several controversies involving WhatsApp’s image generation service, powered by the Meta AI artificial intelligence. Users reported being able to generate content favorable to Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign without difficulty, whereas they were not getting the same results for Lula. Meanwhile, the documentary channel Revelando had videos criticizing Flávio Bolsonaro removed from its Instagram profiles shortly after they were posted, without clear justification from the company. These episodes cast doubt on the consistency of Meta’s moderation and content control systems, exposing failures that call for greater investment and improvement. The situation is made worse by the absence of transparent criteria or guarantees of equal treatment in how ads are handled, how content is recommended, how advertising is priced, and how profiles and posts are moderated. Big Tech companies have developed predatory business models , and they are currently joining forces with political forces committed to deregulation in Brazil . This is part of a strategy to protect their businesses and expand their room for maneuver. Whether or not one side of the electoral race is being deliberately favored, it is indisputable that the major digital platforms continuously exercise the power to determine what gains visibility and what remains on the margins, with no transparency over their criteria and no mechanism for accountability. What is clear is that, for these platforms, defending their economic interests and maximizing their profits prevails above user rights, public interest, and democracy itself. Os autores não prestam consultoria, trabalham, possuem ações ou recebem financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que se beneficiaria deste artigo e não revelaram qualquer vínculo relevante além de seus cargos acadêmicos.

Developing report via The Conversation: Justice, accountability, more questions: what Russell Brand’s guilty verdict means for victim-survivors. International and domestic agencies are assessing immediate developments across opinion sectors.

Iranians at a pro-regime rally in Tehran's Enqelab Square on Nov. 4, 2026, taunt U.S. President Donald Trump and his deputy, JD Vance. Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images While votes were still being counted in the U.S. midterm elections , administration figures in Washington were already inviting speculation over how the results might be connected to the conflict with Iran . On the morning after the election, Vice President JD Vance wrote on X that the major reason for the dramatic loss for Republicans was the American public’s opposition to the war. “Everyone knows why we lost. And any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there,” he wrote, in reference to the ongoing conflict that began with U.S.-Israeli airstrikes against Iran in late February 2026. While it is rare for a vice president to make such a critical proclamation about their own administration’s policy, President Donald Trump later stated that he did not disagree with Vance’s appraisal of the role that frustration with the Iran war played in voters’ minds. But whether this changes Trump’s view on next steps in the ongoing conflict remains unclear. Reporting over the past few weeks has indicated that the U.S. military has been actively preparing options and increasing capabilities in the Persian Gulf region in the event the president directs a resumption of hostilities. As an expert on Middle East affairs and a former senior official at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, I’m aware that months of conflict have failed to bring Iran to its knees, force regime change or militarily defeat a perceived threat to U.S. assets and allies. Escalating now is unlikely to change those realities – and it carries the additional risk of further damaging Republicans in the eyes of Americans voters as they turn toward the 2028 presidential race. Even if Trump were to ratchet up the conflict, moreover, it’s unclear how much wiggle room he’ll have come January facing a Democratic Congress almost uniformly opposed to the war . Demonstrators protest the Iran war near the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool on Nov. 2, 2026. Kevin Carter/Getty Images Sunk costs Part of the issue facing Iran war hawks in Washington now is that the conflict has caused serious setbacks for the regime in Tehran without satisfying the officially stated strategic reasons for going to war. They argue that pulling back now – as welcome as that might be for Americans struggling with the associated rising cost of fuel – may allow Iran to rebuild before the conflict is “won.” Moreover, it would render the military and reputational costs already sunk by Washington as wasted. Among the achievements of this war touted by the Trump administration has been the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khameini , along with the killing of scores of senior leaders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – including individuals like the former head of Iran’s National Security Council Ali Larijani . Significant elements of Iran’s air defense and radar network, ballistic missile and drone production, and storage and launch sites have also been destroyed. And Iran’s already outdated navy and air force has been further degraded. Meanwhile, the U.S.-imposed naval blockade against Iranian-linked shipping in the Persian Gulf cut off a crucial lifeline for Iran’s economy. And additional sanctions and economic penalties imposed by Washington have served to further devalue Iran’s currency and deprive Iran of additional financial links to the international banking system. Down but not out Yet for all the U.S. successes in degrading the Iranian military by limitless aerial bombardment and the significant financial pressure against the Iranian economy, an obvious endgame remains elusive. Despite weakening the Iranian government – now led by Ali Khameinei’s son, Mojtaba, and a new echelon of senior IRGC commanders – the Islamic Republic remains intact. Moreover, it still possesses enough ballistic missiles and drones to hold the region at risk, while continuing to impose significant control over its population . Meanwhile, U.S. military spending continues to rise. In September, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office assessed that the military costs of the Iran War had already totaled US$38 billion . Since then, that number has only increased . And that is to say nothing of the associated global economic costs that have resulted from Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a key shipping route for oil and gas. Should Trump decide to change course on Iran, he – and others – may think that the money, effort and lives of 19 American servicemen killed in the conflict would have been spent with no obvious objective achieved. Yet continued military expenditure with no strategic endgame could only magnify those same costs. The casket of Army Sgt. Angel Rampersad – one of 19 U.S. service members killed in the Iran war. Spencer Platt/Getty Images To Iran, the midterm results have not changed its public position. Mojtaba Khameini has issued statements directing the IRGC to widen the conflict in the region and perhaps beyond should the U.S. and Israel attack again. At the same time, a statement attributed to him indicates that hostilities between the United States and Iran will persist regardless of the balance of party political power in Washington. This raises questions about the prospects for diplomacy . During the summer, the U.S. and Iran agreed to an initial 14-point memorandum of understanding that, if finalized, could have brought a permanent end to the hostilities. But since the 60-day clock on that agreement lapsed , no parallel diplomatic agreement has emerged. No practical solution Even with the major shift in the U.S. political landscape, it remains unclear whether Trump will resume operations against Iran before the new Congress is sworn in. The messy election result in Israel – which has left the pro-war, and potentially outgoing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyanu with potentially more reason to double-down in Iran – only complicates matters. The U.S. military certainly appears to be ready to engage in a new round of attacks against Iran if so directed, and Iran is ready to retaliate. But given the shortcomings in the U.S. inventory – with munitions and missile and air defense capabilities depleted by eight months of war – escalation is something Trump and his inner circle will have to consider with caution. Iran might force the issue by engaging in asymmetric attacks in the region or beyond that they have not attempted already. Or it could launch a coordinated offensive with its partners in the region – notably the Houthis in Yemen, who have become more active in their own conflict with Saudi Arabia in recent months. But save an event that the Trump administration perceives is giving it cover to act, there are no clear indications emerging from Washington as to which way it will move. Vance diagnosed a widely perceived political problem for Republicans: Voters don’t want more war. But what he noticeably didn’t mention was a practical solution. The Middle East conflict – and the United States’ role in it – are, as such, locked in a stalemate. America and Iran have both borne significant political, military and economic costs. A decision not to pursue an endgame would leave those sunk; doing so may only increase them. Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Chris Hyde/Getty Images The Rugby League World Cup (RLWC) reaches its semi-finals this weekend, in a tournament that’s been marked by upsets , nail-biting finishes and some lopsided scorelines . On Saturday in Newcastle, New Zealand’s Kiwi Ferns face Fetu Samoa in the women’s competition, before the Kiwis take on an unbeaten Tonga. Sunday’s matches in Sydney see Australia’s Jillaroos meet Fiji, while their counterparts the Kangaroos face Samoa in a rematch of the previous RLWC men’s final. Pacific nations feature in all four semi-finals. But while the teams represent countries across the region, the vast majority of their players were born in Australia or New Zealand. Our analysis of the semi-final squads found 85% of the women and 95% of the men were born in these two countries. Many have also represented other nations during their international careers. These figures speak to the tight connections between Pacific countries, Australia and New Zealand – and the opportunities rugby league offers players with ties to more than one nation. Small populations, big ties By comparing squad profiles with population data, we can see how migration, family connections and population trends are reflected on the rugby league field. Population size is no guarantee of success in international rugby league. England and France, with populations of around 59 million and 66 million respectively, have already been eliminated. Yet Tonga, home to just 105,000 people, has reached the men’s semi-finals. The Cook Islands, with fewer than 15,000 residents, is the smallest country represented at the tournament. Although the Cook Islands is not in the semi-finals, seven players across the remaining squads have previously represented this proud nation, including Kiwi stars Charnze Nicoll-Klokstad and Apii Nicholls . Generations of migration across Te Moana Nui a Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean) and the Tasman Sea have created deep family ties between these countries. In the women’s semi-finals, 57% of players were born in Australia and another 28% in New Zealand. Twelve players across the Kiwi Ferns and Samoa squads have previously represented other countries, highlighting the overlapping national ties within Pacific rugby league. The Australia-Fiji semi-final, meanwhile, presents a different picture. Only one Jillaroos player in the final team list, Tiana Penitani Gray , has previously represented another country (Tonga), while none of Fiji’s players have done so. Club affiliations show a similar concentration in Australia: 86% of players across the four women’s semi-final squads compete in the National Rugby League Women’s Premiership (NRLW). They are based mostly with Australian clubs, though seven play with New Zealand’s Warriors Women. Fiji is the only team to draw heavily on players from outside the competition. A younger Pacific In the men’s semi-finals, 95% of players were born in Australia (50%) or New Zealand (45%). Seventeen players in the NZ-Tonga squads have previously represented another country, while just two players across the four men’s semi-final teams compete outside the National Rugby League (NRL). The strong presence of NRL and NRLW players also highlights the sporting opportunities available in Australia and New Zealand, and the increasingly diverse populations of both countries. We see such trends in wider migration patterns. In 2023, Australia and New Zealand recorded net migration gains, while Tonga, Samoa and Fiji experienced net losses. Another notable demographic trend is the relatively young populations of Pacific nations. As governments around the world prepare for ageing populations and growing demand for services and pensions, the Pacific remains comparatively youthful. That’s interestingly mirrored in the World Cup squads. In the women’s competition, New Zealand (median age 27 years) and Australia (26) have considerably older squads than Fiji and Samoa (both 22). The pattern is similar among the men, with New Zealand (29) and Australia (28) fielding older squads than Samoa (26) and Tonga (24). The differences are even more pronounced in the wider populations. The median ages of New Zealanders (37) and Australians (38) are much higher than those of people in Fiji (28), Tonga (21) and Samoa (20). Within New Zealand, we can point to a similar pattern. The median age of NZ Europeans is 42, compared with 29 for Fijian New Zealanders, 24 for Samoan New Zealanders and 22 for Tongan New Zealanders. These younger populations offer what we call a “ demographic dividend ”: the potential economic benefits as a growing share of the population enters its working and income-earning years. But these benefits aren’t automatic. Realising them requires investment in young people’s health, education and skills, as well as opportunities to develop their talents and aspirations. When talent meets opportunity Many players representing Pacific nations in this weekend’s semi-finals grew up a long way from the islands they now represent. They and their families were drawn to Australia and New Zealand by opportunities in education, employment and sport. Yet when the chance came, many chose to wear the jersey that reflects their identity, family ties and culture. Their achievements show what’s possible when young people have opportunities to develop their talents. Building on that momentum means continuing to invest in young people, on and off the field, so the next generation can thrive – wherever they call home. The authors acknowledge the contribution of Fiu Penjueli, senior statistician, Fiji Bureau of Statistics. The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Wildfire haze turns San Francisco orange, September 2020. hkalkan / shutterstock This year may be seen as a turning point in the climate crisis. The UN has accepted that global warming is going to exceed 1.5°C, while climate scientists have concluded that the rate of warming has effectively doubled over the past decade. What’s worse, the world may be approaching climate tipping points that could trigger further heating and catastrophic environmental change. Back in 2018, an international team led by Earth system scientist Will Steffen warned that continued greenhouse gas emissions and destruction of biodiversity could produce a cascade of warming that would culminate in the climate systems passing a threshold into a so-called “ Hothouse Earth ”. The engine of this cascade would be individual tipping points in the climate. For example, the shutdown of certain Atlantic Ocean currents would not just plunge Europe into freezing winters, but could significantly starve the Amazon rainforest of water vapour. A drought that turns the Amazon to savanna would have huge consequences for the global carbon cycle and climate system. Further warming would accelerate ice sheet loss and ramp up temperatures. As various tipping points are passed, the Earth system reaches a threshold that could produce a rise in temperatures greater than any for the past 1.2 million years. This would have devastating impacts on ecosystems and societies. Indeed, it’s hard to see how complex, industrialised civilisation would be able to exist in a world that has rapidly warmed beyond 4°C. Are we responding to the risks? To what extent the Earth system has the capacity to produce this sort of cascading warming is a topic of intense scientific research . We may be lucky, in that individual tipping elements such as Atlantic current collapse require much higher levels of warming , or more fundamentally the Earth’s current climate may prove to be more resilient than we think. Unfortunately, the opposite may be the case and a planetary threshold may lurk at lower levels of warming than Steffen and colleagues proposed. The Amazon rainforest may be approaching a tipping point. Manazir Khan / shutterstock It seems reasonable to assume that a deepening climate crisis will focus minds and spur climate action. Unfortunately, new research by my coauthors and I suggests the exact opposite may happen: the worse climate change gets, the harder it could be to stop it. The end point of that process is a disastrous acceleration towards further warming . Rather than being a purely theoretical exercise, we propose that we can begin to see signs of this slide away from climate action in the real world. For example, those nations most at risk from climate change can be caught in a sovereign debt “doom loop” whereby the damage caused by extreme weather reduces their abilities to repay loans and makes it harder to obtain desperately needed finance to both mitigate and adapt to climate change. This feedback loop can derail climate policy over time: as debt servicing consumes growing shares of government revenue, climate investments are sidelined, and the country becomes increasingly exposed to climate change. Increased warming can also increase conflict , thus undermining international cooperation required for mitigation. This is affected by a range of socioeconomic factors, such as inequality and political polarisation. For example, see the increase in popularity of Spain’s far right-wing and climate-denying Vox party following the devastating Valencia floods of 2024. While the floods were made much more likely because of human-caused climate change, Vox argued that it was left-wing “ideological” environmental policies that made people more vulnerable to the intense rainfall. The name we give to these dynamics is “ derailment risk ”, the situation where the consequences of climate change makes it harder to deal with the drivers of climate change, and so sustainability efforts end up being derailed. Planetary stewardship Given the potentially devastating consequences of a Hothouse Earth, it seems sensible to minimise the chances of it happening as much as possible. To that end, climate and Earth system scientists have argued that active management of this risk is required. This “planetary stewardship” goes beyond phasing out the burning of fossil fuels to include strengthening forests, peatlands and other natural stores of carbon, along with behavioural changes, technological innovations, new ways of governing, and transforming social values. But derailment risks could undermine the political and social conditions needed to establish any sort of planetary stewardship. How the planet could slide into a Hothouse Earth state. Steffen, Will, et al. , CC BY A key concept here is agency – the capacity to produce change. In the original hothouse framework, agency is essentially one way. Humans affect the Earth system by destabilising it. But humans are not simply an external force acting on the Earth system: we are part of it, and our social and political forces can influence its stability and whether the planet slides into a hothouse state. We argue that the feedback loops pulling us towards derailment can be stronger than those needed to establish planetary stewardship. That’s because collective action can be easier to destroy than build. At a psychological level, bad events affect people more strongly than good events. This is a factor in how trust within a society can be much easier to undermine than create. Increasing climate change impacts could therefore erode the social institutions needed to sustain effective mitigation and adaptation, just when they are most needed. To respond to this risk we propose a three-stage framework for assessing and managing derailment threats. First, identify and map feedback loops between the human and natural world; second, anticipate disruption and build resilience; third, develop active responsive governance strategies for periods of escalating instability. Humans are entirely responsible for the climate and ecological crisis, but we also hold the solutions. Maintaining our agency – the ability to put solutions into practice – may prove to be the keystone for all climate policies. James Dyke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Progressive Abdul El-Sayed’s victory in Michigan’s U.S. Senate race was one of the most-watched contests in the 2026 midterm elections. As the results for this race came in, I had my eye on one demographic: Black voters. I am a political scientist who studies Black political behavior. My research has been published in numerous journals , as well as in my forthcoming book, “Black Resilience,” which examines Black voters’ political participation. Wayne County voters The support of Black voters for El-Sayed was not a given. In the August primary, 62% of Detroit voters chose U.S. Rep. Haley Stevens over El-Sayed. Many pundits predicted it would be difficult for El-Sayed to gain support in Detroit, which is about 75% Black . After the primary, El-Sayed made overtures by sharing his plans to improve the lives of Black Americans, which included supporting the growth of minority-owned businesses, creating more affordable housing, eliminating food deserts and expanding the Rx Kids cash assistance program nationwide. About 91.8% of Detroit voters supported El-Sayed in the general election, according to the city’s unofficial results . Detroit City Clerk Janice Winfrey said 209,924 residents voted in the 2026 midterms , up about 21% from the 2022 midterm elections. For the 2024 presidential election, 247,770 city residents cast a ballot. In fact, El-Sayed received 70.6% of Wayne County votes , which includes Detroit. In 2024, Kamala Harris received 62.7% of the vote in Wayne County . Statewide support is holding steady In the 2024 presidential election, Michigan’s Democratic vote share fell to 48.3% , from 50.6% in 2020 , as the state went for Donald Trump instead of Democratic nominee Harris. Despite their ideological differences, Sen. Elissa Slotkin and El-Sayed drew similar support among Black voters. In 2024, Slotkin – a moderate Democrat – won 48.6% of the vote, a small margin over Mike Rogers, who was the Republican candidate in that race. In 2026, El-Sayed defeated Rogers statewide by a substantially wider margin, winning 52% of the vote. In other words, these early election results do not indicate whether Black voters embraced El-Sayed’s progressive platform or simply voted for the Democratic candidate. Voters may have been rejecting Republican Party politics or expressing anger toward Trump over pocketbook issues. Researchers from Michigan State University found that precincts with more than 80% of Black voters supported Democratic statewide candidates over Republicans at a rate of 92% to 94% during the 2024 general election, which is only slightly lower than the 94% to 95% levels observed in similar precincts during the 2020 contest between Trump and Joe Biden. Even while Black voters overwhelmingly support Democrats, small shifts in their support and turnout can influence the outcome of close and competitive races. These shifts may help explain differing outcomes, including El-Sayed’s victory in 2026 and Harris’ defeat there in 2024. While Black voter support for El-Sayed was high, estimated at around 86% statewide , Gov. Gretchen Whitmer’s support among Black voters was about 94% in the 2022 gubernatorial race, according to an ABC exit poll . Similarly, preelection polling indicated that Jocelyn Benson, the Democratic nominee for governor, polled more favorably among nonwhite voters compared to El-Sayed . NBC exit poll data shows that 86% of Black voters in Michigan supported El-Sayed, while 90% supported Benson , who won the governorship over Republican John James. Historic power and unity Black voters are often strategic voters who support the candidate they believe best aligns with Black interests, which has usually been the Democratic candidate since the Civil Rights Movement. Generally, Black voters have made their electoral choices based on what’s believed to be best for the group as a whole – a concept described by political scientist Michael C. Dawson as linked fate . However, recent research shows that Black social networks and institutions, including churches and civic organizations, reinforce expectations of political solidarity . Weaker ties to these networks may lessen the social pressure that encourages Black Americans to participate in politics and support Democratic candidates. Lower participation by Black Americans could lead to elected officials paying less attention to issues important to Black voters, such as affordability and the cost of living, healthcare, and reducing racial discrimination . If officials assume Black voters will remain loyal to Democrats, they’re under less pressure to win their votes by addressing their concerns. My research has demonstrated that after the 2024 election, Black women in particular felt frustrated with the Democratic Party, yet they participated in elections despite these frustrations. An agenda that matters El-Sayed was part of a field of notable Democratic candidates in this election cycle. For example, Angie Nixon, a state representative in Florida, championed affordability alongside a moratorium on evictions and a universal jobs program , while James Talarico, a former schoolteacher in Texas, focused on public education. El-Sayed is a former public health official who had not previously held elected office. This may have turned off some Black voters who often value governing experience . El-Sayed advocated for Medicare For All and lowering the costs of gas prices and groceries. Although he doesn’t identify as a democratic socialist, El-Sayed campaigned with several progressive elected officials, such as U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders endorsed El-Sayed on the day he announced his candidacy in 2025. El-Sayed also campaigned with the Black establishment, including U.S. Rep. Jim Clyburn of South Carolina. Former President Barack Obama spoke at a rally for El-Sayed in Detroit in October 2026. Stevens, who lost the Democratic nomination to El-Sayed in the primary, endorsed Republican Mike Rogers after she attended a service with the Republican candidate at a predominantly Black church in Detroit two days before the election . Stevens’ tactic drew severe backlash from Democratic leaders and may have mobilized some Black voters to turn out for El-Sayed on Election Day. “I felt like she pimped my community,” one Black voter from Detroit told ABC News in response to Stevens’ last-minute endorsement of Rogers. Christine Slaughter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images New Zealand First leader Winston Peters – a veteran of 18 general elections – has called this long and sometimes fractious campaign “the worst of my career, easily”. But whether you agree with him or not, tomorrow night still promises exciting live entertainment. Will Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and his three-party coalition be removed from office after just one term? Will they be replaced by a left-wing coalition led by Labour’s Chris Hipkins – the same man who lost to Luxon in 2023? Will the Opportunity Party make it over the 5% threshold for seats in parliament, potentially holding the balance of power? More technically, will the various campaigns to have voters split their two available votes (one for their electorate candidate, one for their preferred party) have a bearing on the result? Normally in New Zealand’s mixed member proportional ( MMP ) system, the election numbers that really count are the party-vote percentages. This time, however, individual electorates will matter more than usual. With polls promising a very tight race, here are some numbers and possible scenarios to track on the night. Overhangs on the left or right A parliamentary overhang happens when a party wins more local electorate seats than it would have been awarded in proportion with its percentage of the party vote. The overhang seats are added (above parliament’s normal 120) to accommodate those extra winners of single-member districts. Overhangs of one to three seats have occurred before. But this election campaign has seen organised efforts on both the left and right to deliberately use the overhang rule to increase the number of seats their respective sides can win. Te Pāti Māori is ignoring the party vote entirely and asking supporters to deliver wins in the Māori electorates but give their party vote to Labour or the Greens (which would increase the overall party vote on the left). Winning three to five Māori electorates would greatly outweigh Te Pāti Māori’s party vote entitlement, which could go below 1%. The number of overhang seats produced on the left will be a major talking point on the night. A counter-strategy on the right (not officially endorsed by the National Party) assumes National can win more electorates than its party vote (possibly below 30%) would warrant. The campaign is asking right-wing voters to keep the left-wing parties out of office by party-voting ACT or New Zealand First, and giving electorate votes to the National candidates. By some calculations , if that works, it significantly increases the odds of a right-coalition victory. Read more: Election Policy Tracker: your guide to what the parties are promising during the 2026 election campaign Tactical voting and skewed results It’s impossible to predict how many voters will heed the calls for tactical vote splitting. In the 2023 election , 35.51% of voters split their votes, compared to 27.33% in 2020. National voters were the least likely to do so. Nonetheless, the overall impact of these opposing strategies to maximise the overhang could increase the size of the next parliament and alter the balance of power. On the night, watch the numbers of electorate seats won by National and Te Pāti Māori. In 2023, National won 44 electorates and 38.1% of the party vote. Five MPs from the party list then made up its proportional share of seats. If National’s party vote falls to around 30% this time, we’d normally expect its number of electorate seats to fall, too – maybe below 30. But if ACT and New Zealand First voters do split their votes, National could win more local electorate seats than the party vote would normally deliver overall. If National wins 29% of the party vote, for example, that would normally entitle it to 35 seats. Predictions are hazardous, but National could conservatively win 39 or more electorates. One peculiar outcome could be that Labour gets a higher party vote than National, but National wins more seats than Labour. That’s the kind of disproportionate outcome that brought the old first-past-the-post system into disrepute after the 1978 and 1981 elections. Balance of power? Opportunity Party leader Qiulae Wong visits parliament before the election. Marty Melville/AFP via Getty Images Opportunity and uncertainty The next number to watch is the Opportunity Party’s party-vote percentage. Polls indicate it will make it over the 5% threshold for seats in parliament for the first time. That’s no guarantee – polls are often wrong. But if it does, Opportunity could hold the balance of power after the election. The party’s stated inability to work with New Zealand First (especially after the Michael Laws fiasco ) could significantly affect coalition negotiations. The combined party votes of National and Labour will be another key factor. Since the MMP system began in 1996, that number hasn’t gone below 62%. The lowest was 62.03% in 1996, and the highest was 81.3% in 2017. Going by opinion polls, that sum may go below 60% this time – the flip side being that smaller parties stand to gain. In 2023 , the Greens won 11.6% of the party vote, ACT 8.6% and NZ First 6.1%. If the polls are more or less correct, all three will get a boost. This, too, could be aided by tactical vote splitting. Be ready to wait for a result And we mustn’t forget election-night numbers are only provisional. There are still special votes to count, and there were over 600,000 of those in 2023. In recent elections, the Greens and Labour have picked up one or two seats between election night and the final count, at the expense of National. And electorate cliffhangers can be important, too, including maybe one or two Māori seats. Small shifts in seat numbers over the following three weeks could affect prospects for government formation. The final tally takes three weeks , with coalition negotiations between the parties potentially taking several more. The race isn’t truly won until the governor general swears in a new administration – maybe by Christmas, maybe later. Although the party that wins the largest percentage of the party vote is normally in pole position to form the next government, that doesn’t necessarily mean they’ll succeed in doing so. As I write, no one even knows exactly how many seats there will be in parliament – but everything will depend on which workable coalition holds a majority of them. The leader of the party that comes second may not concede defeat on the night. There may still be everything to play for. Grant Duncan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The US midterm elections have shifted the balance of power in Congress, delivering a massive blow to Donald Trump and his Republican party. This has implications both at home and possibly abroad, including for US policy towards Ukraine; an issue that was hardly mentioned during the campaigns. But even if Ukraine did not figure much in the election, the question in US politics of what to do about the war has not gone away. Indeed, in the weeks and months before the result was announced, Trump had been busily rowing back on US support for Ukraine. This was despite much opposition, even from some Republicans. Crucial intelligence to Kyiv about Russian strikes was cut off , before later being reinstated, while critical military aid was reduced. Trump also decided to suspend several sanctions on Russia. This move was denounced by President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine as only helping Russia, but justified by Trump as being “in the national interests of the United States” and also a decision that might help his party’s electoral chances by reducing gas prices. In the end, none of this helped Trump and the Republicans. Yet few commentators believe that the midterm results, disastrous though they have been for Trump, will have very much impact on his foreign policy outlook and his policy towards Ukraine in particular. “The Trump administration’s foreign policy is like a car going down the highway,” said James Green, a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform and former Congressional aide in Washington, recently. “Congress has the ability to slow that car down, maybe make it put on a turn signal, but it’s going to be very difficult for Congress to change the overall route over the next two years.” In part, this has to do with how foreign policy is determined in the US. Congress is not without some influence. It can hold hearings, subpoena executive branch officials, as well as exercise control over the purse. Yet as commander-in-chief and head of state with a vast foreign policy bureaucracy supporting him, the president retains significant foreign policy powers . The Democrats are also unlikely to make Ukraine front and centre after the midterms. They will have other more important fish to fry, the most critical being how to make sure they come up with a candidate and programme that will win them the White House in 2028. Yet Ukraine is a cause which many Democrats and quite a few Republicans have championed for some time. Nor are they likely to forget what ordinary Americans think about Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. The war in Ukraine may not be something they think about on a daily basis. On the other hand, as the Pew Research Center showed in 2025, 67% of Americans distrust Putin while six in ten view Russia as an enemy. Democrats may not wish to become embroiled in a European war. But having just scored a sweeping landslide victory, they may well calculate there is a good deal of political mileage to be had now in escalating their attack on a weakened Trump if his foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine continues in their view to reward an aggressor while making the victim of that aggression look like an obstacle to a settlement. Pushing for a peace deal? If the midterms result presents a series of opportunities for the Democrats, while posing a challenge to Trump, it also presents Putin with a possible opportunity. The Russian leader may well try and exploit Trump’s domestic position by offering some kind of settlement that would allow the US president to claim a victory. US, Chinese and Russian officials have already been holding talks about a summit when the heads of state travel to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit later in November. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has said Russia hopes to finalise the meeting in the coming days. Trump is similarly keen on such a meeting. He told reporters in October that Ukraine would be discussed at the meeting, adding : “I would meet in order – anything I can do to end the war, whether somebody is there or not, whatever I can do to end the war.” This might sound reasonable enough. However, deciding the fate of a sovereign country which won’t be at the negotiating table, and coming to some kind of “great power” deal with two authoritarian countries that involves Ukraine losing 20% of its territory, is almost certainly something an emboldened Democratic party in Congress will not take lying down. Nor, according to most military experts, would it be wise to concede anything to Russia when its war against Ukraine appears to have run into the ground. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia may have “secured a temporary advantage in the skies over Ukraine through their jet-powered drones and the shortage of Patriot missiles that can intercept their ballistic missiles”. But as the institute also points out, unless western military aid dries up entirely, a Russian victory is by no means inevitable. A war that most experts, including the CIA, predicted would be over in a matter of months is thus likely to go on. Trump is unlikely to change his mind about Russia and Ukraine. Russia in his mind’s eye will continue to be regarded as a potential partner, and Ukraine a country that has taken assistance from the US and given “absolutely nothing back except grief”. But now, with his back to the wall politically and the Democrats in charge of Congress in a country that has just passed a decisive verdict on his presidency, shaping his own agenda in relation to Russia and Ukraine is likely to prove more difficult. Michael Cox was a founding director of LSE IDEAS and is an associate fellow at Chatham House.

The young men and Hispanic and Latino voters who helped propel Donald Trump to his presidential victory in 2024 swung sharply towards the Democrats in the midterm elections, contributing to the historic defeat for Republicans. Charles Hunt, an associate professor of political science at Boise State University in Idaho, tells The Conversation Weekly podcast that the results suggest weakened support for Trump and his MAGA movement among these key groups of voters. Hispanic and Latino voters “swung heavily towards Trump in 2024”, Hunt says. But midterm results in Florida, Texas and elsewhere “are showing these voters just slingshotting completely in the other direction,” he explains, citing early exit polls and analysis by The New York Times . Not just back towards where they were in, say, 2018 or 2020 in terms of support for Democrats, but past that – being more supportive of folks like James Talarico in Texas than they have been of any Democrat in the last 20 years. That’s really, really significant, especially since that’s a growing part of the electorate. The New York Times’ analysis of voting trends reveals young voters swung back toward the Democratic Party by more than 30 percentage points – the largest shift of any age group. Young men, in particular, swung strongly back towards the Democrats. The AP Voter Poll , a sweeping survey of voters across all 50 states, shows Democrats regaining ground among young and Hispanic voters, too. The scale of the Republicans’ defeat goes beyond the usual midterm backlash against a sitting president, Hunt says. He draws a comparison with the 1974 midterm elections following the Watergate scandal and then-President Richard Nixon’s resignation: This is a level of […] midterm blowback against an incumbent president of the sort that we haven’t seen since 1974. […] It’s really pretty historic and in a completely different league than 2018. So what drove voters towards the Democrats? Economic pressures are one reason, Hunt says. He points to the effects of the Iran war and tariffs, particularly on highly visible costs such as petrol: A lot of political science tells us that economic issues are almost always front of mind for voters. But those pressures also gave force to Democratic messaging about corruption and an economy favouring billionaires. He adds: I think those issues tie together with a lot of Democratic messaging around things like corruption, and the influence of billionaires, and Elon Musk spending half a billion dollars in this election probably did not help, at the end of the day. Disclosure statement Charles Hunt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. Credits This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Justin Bergman, Gemma Ware and executive producer Grace Jennings-Edquist. Mixing by Michelle Macklem and theme music by Neeta Sarl. Newsclips in this episode from Fox News , WCNC , CBS Pittsburgh and MS Now . Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here . A transcript of this episode is available via the Apple Podcasts or Spotify apps.

Anna Moneymaker/Getty The Democrats’ sweeping victory in the US midterm elections puts them in a stronger position to interfere with President Donald Trump’s agenda. This includes his deeply unpopular and costly war against Iran, which could be among their first priorities. As president, Trump will be able to veto any legislation aimed at ending the war. But the Democrats still have another powerful card up their sleeves: cutting off funding for the war. There are caveats, however. History suggests exercising this power could trigger a political confrontation that may backfire. And even if the Democrats succeed in ending the war, they may not be able to reverse the damage it has done to the US’ global standing. The limits of legislation Democrats will have three main options to try to force the war against Iran to a close. Two of these, however, face significant limitations. The first – and perhaps most obvious – option is through legislation. There are a few different ways to do this. One approach is to pass a resolution calling for an end to the war. Congress already attempted this in June, passing a concurrent resolution (with the support of some Republicans) that directed the president to either withdraw US forces from hostilities against Iran or seek the approval of Congress before continuing. This was done under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 . These so-called concurrent resolutions are, however, widely seen as non-binding . Intended to express the opinion or will of Congress, they are generally used to deal with internal matters within Congress. Trump ignored it. A similar resolution then failed in the Senate in September. For such a resolution to be binding, it would need the force of a law passed by Congress, which the president would likely veto. To overcome that veto, the Democrats would need the support of a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate. This would require a significant number of Republicans to cross the aisle. Exercising oversight A second option for the Democrats is to launch a series of congressional investigations into the way the war has been conducted. This would likely include public hearings, subpoenas and demands for documents from the Trump administration. The Democrats may also attempt to impeach senior officials in the Trump administration. If Hakeem Jeffries, the Democrat tipped to become the next speaker of the House, wants to appease some of the more progressive voices in his party – or the hardline voices on the Iran war or against Trump – Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth could be targeted for impeachment. But the grounds for such proceedings are unclear at this stage, and even with the Democrats’ new Senate majority, he would be unlikely to be convicted unless a significant number of Republicans crossed the aisle. More pertinently, congressional investigations are a protracted process, and unlikely to bring the war to a swift end. The ‘power of the purse’ The more immediate power that Congress has to end the war swiftly is in Article I, Section 9 of the US Constitution, which states: No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law […] This is known as the “ power of the purse ”. Once the new Congress is sworn in in January, every new dollar that Trump’s Department of War wants to spend needs to be approved by the House and the Senate. A Democrat-controlled Congress could put a clause into the defence budget, prohibiting funds from being used for hostilities against Iran. Trump could veto this, but this would mean blocking the paycheck for everyone in the military, as well. The Democrats tried this very approach in 2007, attempting to force a timetable for a US withdrawal from Iraq. Then-President George W. Bush vetoed it , but it became a political football, with both sides accusing the other of leaving US troops unfunded. The Democrats ultimately backed down due to the growing risk of backlash from voters. Today, this approach would carry a similar risk. Are the Democrats willing to put their political credibility on the line if the president accuses them of letting American soldiers down? Who blinks first? Republicans face a reckoning As the dust settled on Wednesday, Trump himself acknowledged the Iran war had played a role in the Republican Party’s crushing defeat. But he doubled down on the decision, saying he would do it all over again if necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Vice President JD Vance was less defensive. In a detailed statement posted to X , Vance bluntly declared the war was the reason the Republicans lost. He added, “any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there”. Vance has long criticised US military involvement in overseas conflicts, but in his role as vice president has publicly backed Trump’s actions against Iran. This week’s overwhelming Democratic victory has made it much easier for Vance – and other Republicans – to now break ranks with the president. The balance of power has shifted For Trump, bringing the war to an end now would mean humiliation. The US has so far poured almost US$50 billion into a military campaign with few tangible achievements. On top of that, Iran has learned that the Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint it can control. The same is true for the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen, where the Iran-aligned Houthis have attacked commercial ships. These costs will outlast the Trump presidency. The war might definitively bring to an end the unipolar global order Washington built after the end of the Cold War. The biggest winner may not be Tehran, but Beijing. Markus Wagner received funding from the Australian Department of Defence as principal investigator for the Weaponised Trade project.

On 25 October 2026, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured a fourth term in an election that exposed both the resilience of Brazilian democracy and the depth of the far right’s social roots. Lula received 51.79% of valid votes in the runoff against far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro’s 48.21%. Three weeks earlier, however, the outcome had looked very different : Flávio - son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, now jailed for a coup attempt after losing his bid for reelection in 2022 - led the first round with 47.03% of the valid votes, compared with Lula’s 45.16%. The reversal was not simply an electoral comeback. It revealed how a campaign that had failed to generate enthusiasm could be transformed through collective mobilization, both online and in the streets. The first round result was a warning against complacency. Lula’s campaign leaned heavily on his historical achievements and the restoration of policies associated with his previous Workers’ Party (PT) governments. These accomplishments were real, but they did not necessarily offer a persuasive answer to a question increasingly heard among voters: what comes next? For those who have voted for Lula repeatedly over decades, the promise of continuity could coexist with political fatigue. His age and the campaign’s difficulty in speaking to younger voters added to this sense of exhaustion. Meanwhile, the assumption that Jair Bolsonaro’s imprisonment had removed any serious electoral threat proved dangerously mistaken. A central contradiction was that the defense of social policies did not automatically translate into a sense of economic security. Many households continued to experience the erosion of purchasing power, high borrowing costs and persistent indebtedness. According to a Brazil’s National Confederation of Commerce’s July 2026 survey , 82% of Brazilian families reported outstanding debts, 29.8% had overdue bills, and debt payments absorbed approximately 29.5% of monthly household income. Among families earning up to three times the country’s minimum wage, indebtedness reached 84.9%. The politics of everyday insecurity Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign managed to combine continuity and novelty . His surname preserved his father’s political identity and loyal electorate, while his comparatively younger image, disciplined media performances and lack of experience in the federal Executive allowed him to present himself as an alternative to incumbent Lula. Flávio was not a political outsider: his legislative career was substantial. Yet the campaign’s effectiveness lay in its ability to turn familiar grievances into an apparently new political offer. Public security was especially important in this. Fear of street crime, mobile phone theft and drug trafficking were connected to a broader discourse of order and punishment. The invocation of “narcoterrorism” also resonated with the language of United States’ President Donald Trump administration, demonstrating how domestic electoral agendas are increasingly entangled with geopolitical narratives. The campaign likewise foregrounded supermarket prices, debt and the difficulty saving money. Not every issue was directly within the federal government’s remit, but the political effect was to hold Lula accountable for the totality of everyday insecurity. The territorial pattern of the vote also matters. The first round strength of the far right in rural regions and municipalities in the country’s interior points to the consolidation of what might be called agribusiness linked “Bolsonarismo” . This is not to suggest that agribusiness is politically homogeneous, or that every rural voter supports the far right. Rather, it indicates that a powerful political alignment has taken shape across parts of Brazil’s Center-West, the interior of populous and rich São Paulo state and other areas where export oriented agriculture exercises economic and social influence. Its expansion into new agricultural frontiers, including the “MATOPIBA” region - encompassing parts of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí and Bahia states, between the Center-West and Northeast regions of the country - merits systematic electoral and territorial research. “From mourning to struggle” The morning after the first round of the election on October 4 was marked by a profound sense of defeat in Lula’s campaign. Flávio had finished ahead, and the far right had strengthened its institutional presence. The possibility of a return to Bolsonarismo was no longer abstract. Yet, mourning quickly gave way to mobilization. In Portuguese, the transition can be captured in a phrase that is difficult to translate without losing its force: “do luto à luta”, or “from mourning to struggle”. Students took to the streets in Rio de Janeiro state; and soon after marches and smaller neighborhood actions multiplied. Artists, musicians, trade unions and people with little previous experience of organized politics joined demonstrations, leafleting, cultural events and local conversations. It was not merely a sequence of large political rallies. Its significance lay in the diffusion of political activity into everyday spaces: campuses, homes, cultural centers, workplaces and neighborhood networks. Lula’s campaign gained more capillarity, extending beyond the formal structures of parties and electoral committees. Digital mobilization developed in parallel. Influencers urged supporters to remain active, and a WhatsApp channel created by Brazilian congressman André Janones - “Lula’s Army” - provided a recognizable language for coordinated social media campaigning. Supporters exchanged practical guidance about posting, sharing and the unintended consequences of amplifying adversarial content. The far right had long invested in these techniques. What was striking in the runoff was the left’s rapid appropriation of similar forms of distributed communication. But the most important innovation was not technological. It was political. Online networks and street mobilization reinforced one another. Digital messages brought people into public spaces, while visible demonstrations gave online activism a sense of momentum and legitimacy. In a fragmented media environment, neither the street nor the screen was sufficient on its own. A democratic front beyond the left A further condition of Lula’s comeback was the recognition that the traditional right and Bolsonarismo were not identical. The runoff brought together figures with very different political histories, including liberal economists, conservative public personalities and people who had opposed previous Workers’ Party governments. The appeal was not that everyone should become a Lula supporter. It was that defending the possibility of political disagreement required preventing an authoritarian political project from returning to Executive power. This distinction mattered because anti-PT sentiment remained deeply rooted among parts of the Brazilian electorate. Asking voters to endorse Lula’s entire record would have narrowed the coalition. Asking them to defend democratic institutions, even while disagreeing with Lula, opened a broader space. Such a front is necessarily contradictory: its members do not share a single economic program or social vision. Yet, this plurality was its democratic strength along the runoff. Policy debates also returned to the foreground. Proposals to end the six days on, one day off work schedule and move toward a 40 hour work week without wage reductions helped connect democratic mobilization to material demands. Income tax relief, minimum wage increases, protection for app workers such as Uber, social transfers and assistance to small entrepreneurs formed part of the wider political debate. These initiatives differed considerably in legal status: some reflected existing programs, others pending legislation or campaign commitments. What they did show was the importance of linking a defense of democracy to the conditions of working class life. Lula ultimately won more than 64 million votes , reversing the first round defeat. This victory should not be romanticized as the achievement of any single party leader, digital strategy or government announcement. It emerged from an exceptional convergence of political organization, public engagement and the formation of a broader democratic coalition. The economic limits of political victory Winning the election did not resolve the structural tensions facing a fourth Lula administration. The financial market reaction to the result underscored the distance between electoral expectations and investor preferences, while renewed demands for fiscal adjustment raised the prospect of conflict over the government’s social commitments. The central question is whether a government elected through a popular mobilization can maintain and expand social protections under a policy regime that prioritizes expenditure restraint and monetary credibility. The benchmark interest rate stood at 13.75% a year following Brazil’s Central Bank’s September 2026 decision. Orthodox interpretations emphasize fiscal credibility, expectations and debt sustainability, arguing that restraint on primary spending can create conditions for lower rates. Critical and heterodox interpretations stress how persistently high real interest rates can themselves fuel debt accumulation, potentially making austerity economically and socially self defeating. The original Brazilian constitutional spending ceiling introduced under President Michel Temer in 2016 was replaced by a new fiscal framework in 2023. That institutional change matters, but it did not eliminate the political struggle over fiscal limits. The risk for Lula is that accommodating market demands through cuts to social expenditure could undermine the very constituencies whose mobilization secured his victory. Conversely, an ambitious social agenda without a strategy for managing financing conditions and political opposition would face significant obstacles. Democracy, geopolitics and the unfinished struggle Three additional challenges will shape next Lula’s administration. The first is the resilience of the “Bolsonarismo” movement. The presidential defeat did not dissolve its electorate, networks or institutional influence. The far right remains capable of organizing around security, moral conflict and dissatisfaction with living standards. A democratic victory at the ballot box is therefore not the same as the political defeat of authoritarianism. The second is public security. Treating violence exclusively as a state level matter is increasingly untenable when national electoral politics and international narratives of “narcoterrorism” shape the debate. A progressive response must address genuine insecurity without reproducing punitive approaches that disproportionately affect poorer and racialized communities. This will require a social as well as an institutional agenda. The third is geopolitical autonomy. Brazil will have to negotiate with the Trump administration over trade and tariffs while deepening economic relations with China and maintaining a commitment to diversified South–South partnerships. These objectives are not automatically incompatible, but their reconciliation will become harder as competition between major global power intensifies. The question is whether Brazil can defend its policy space and development priorities without being forced into an exclusive alignment. The lesson of the October 2026 elections in Brazil is thus both hopeful and sobering. Collective mobilization can change the course of an election, even when the political atmosphere appears exhausted and defeat seems inevitable. But the energy that makes an electoral comeback possible must confront structures that do not disappear on election night: entrenched economic power, social inequality, geopolitical pressure and the organized strength of the far right. The transition from mourning to struggle was decisive for Lula’s victory. Whether that struggle can also expand democracy’s social and economic foundations is the question that now remains. Ana Saggioro Garcia não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

The 2026 midterm elections exposed three critical Republican failures, from the affordability crisis to the Iran war, that could reshape the 2028 race.

Medicare for all, ICE abolition and Supreme Court expansion are set to become Democratic priorities as the 2028 presidential primary heats up.

France logged roughly 1,320 antisemitic incidents in 2025 while swastika graffiti clusters and intifada calls spread across the United States and beyond.

Donald Trump’s Republican Party has received a stunning rebuke in the US midterm elections. Republicans went into the evening hoping that the polls might be wrong and that they could at least cling on to control of the Senate. But by midnight in Washington, the GOP was staring down what looked like its worst defeat in 50 years. Republican losses were not just confined to the type of swing districts that parties usually worry about on election night . The scale of the losses was staggering. They lost Senate seats in deep red states such as Texas and South Carolina. They lost districts they had gerrymandered and in which they were supposed to be unbeatable. They lost seats that even the sharpest analysts thought were safe. Why? For months, surveys have shown that voters are fed up with high prices, with the war in Iran, and with what is increasingly being talked about as the Trump administration’s corruption. A president who was narrowly elected on the promise of a steady economic hand instead spent two years pursuing an extreme ideological agenda favoured only by a minority of Americans. He ignored what voters were saying, and now they have delivered a harsh verdict. Read more: What recent polling suggests will happen in the US midterm elections But these results have implications beyond just the remainder of Trump’s presidency. They break some of the patterns that have defined American politics for decades. Democrats are suddenly winning in places where they have been counted out for a generation. Suddenly, the American political map looks different. Take Texas. The last time a Democrat won election as a senator there was 1988. Democrats have not won a presidential election in Texas since Jimmy Carter in 1976. Yet last night, Democrat James Talarico powered to a convincing victory. If elections in Texas become politically competitive on a permanent basis, it will become much harder for Republicans to take the presidency in the future. The Republican Party will now be looking nervously towards the 2028 election. For the first time since 2016, there is likely to be a serious debate within the party about whether to move on from the aggressive nationalism and bigotry of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement. Democrats, meanwhile, face their own questions about how to capitalise on their victories. Foreign policy futures But for the rest of the world, change might not come so quickly. Despite the fact that his party has suffered this electoral setback, Trump remains president until 2028. And because despite its constitutional role in declaring war and ratifying treaties, Congress tends to be less involved in foreign policy, there is still a lot that he can do with that power. Indeed, US presidents whose parties perform badly in midterm elections often become more active in foreign policy than they had previously. With the chance of passing a significant domestic agenda mostly beyond their reach, they have a more time on their hands to think about America’s relations with the rest of the world. The same is likely to be true of Trump. The fact that the midterms are over also means that Trump no longer has to be so careful about the political consequences of his actions. As the midterm elections got closer, the president has backed down from major military confrontation with Iran and sought a truce in his tariff wars. Now, with political constraints lifted, he could become more erratic and unpredictable. Congress would not be completely powerless to stop him, at least in theory. But most actions it can take – such as cutting off funding for the war with Iran or seizing tariff power back from the president – require margins of control in both chambers that Democrats are unlikely to have, despite their formidable victories. They would need to have a two-thirds majority to override an almost certain presidential veto on any attempt to pass laws to achieve these outcomes. So a key question is whether this midterm drubbing was serious enough to make some Republican members of Congress get serious about joining Democrats in restraining Trump. Something that Democrats will definitely be able to do is launch all manner of investigations into the conduct of the Trump administration and some of its officials. Their efforts are likely to focus on the war with Iran, Trump’s personal financial dealings with foreign leaders, and the management of the Pentagon by secretary of defence Pete Hegseth. Hegseth, indeed, could be an early casualty of these efforts – there is speculation that he will resign or be fired rather than face possible impeachment. But ultimately a change of direction in US foreign policy depends on the decisions of Trump himself. A changing of the guard among his advisers, or in Congress, can only do so much to influence a president who has never willingly submitted to constraint. The world should prepare itself for the possibility that a politically wounded and angry Trump could now decide to vent his frustrations abroad. Andrew Gawthorpe is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

Supporters of South Carolina Democratic Senate candidate Annie Andrews cheer during her election night watch party on Nov. 3, 2026, in Charleston, S.C. AP Photo/Mic Smith Voters turned out in massive numbers on Election Day to hand Democrats control of Congress, in a sweeping snub of President Donald Trump and Republicans. Democrats won several statewide races in places long considered GOP bastions , including races that were considered insurmountable even weeks ago . Democrats took control of the House and Senate , flipping Senate seats in Texas , South Carolina, North Carolina, Kansas and Ohio. The results reflected broad dissatisfaction across the country with Trump, his agenda and the candidates he had endorsed. The Conversation’s senior politics editor, Alfonso Serrano, spoke on election night with Charlie Hunt, a scholar at Boise State University who studies Congress and elections . It was obviously a strong showing for Democrats on Election Day, something that was even evident in the margin of some Democratic losses. What does it tell you, for example, that democratic socialist Angie Nixon fought a competitive race for the Senate in Florida? There is this big uniform shift toward the Democrats that we’re seeing really across virtually all kinds of locations and geographies and counties. What I think is particularly notable here, and something we were on the lookout for in this election, and we’re seeing it, is the substantial shift in the Hispanic vote from 2024 in places like Texas and Florida, where you’re getting these 30-to-35 point shifts from how Donald Trump performed in 2024. That was a big part of what helped him win , and it seems like it has snapped right back and even farther in the other direction. This is what made Florida, I think, closer than a lot of folks thought. It’s what put a number of really, really right-leaning districts in play, particularly in South Florida. And it looks like it is going to help Democrats keep the number of seats they had in Florida in the House that they had before the election, which is incredible when you consider that Florida did this mid-decade gerrymander to try to get them out of a bunch of those seats. Some rural areas of the country were also more competitive than expected, like North Carolina’s 11th Congressional District, where Democrat Jaime Ager flipped a conservative district . What does that tell you? It’s definitely an indicator of at least one of these two things. One is just really massive Democratic turnout across the board. Regardless of where they live, Democrats were so enthusiastic and energized to turn out that they did so across all different types of districts and counties. It could also be an indicator of some cross-party voting, where Republicans are crossing over in some cases and voting for the Democrat. I don’t imagine there’s a ton of that, but in a lot of these close districts, and if you’ve got enough of those folks in places like Texas, it really does make a big difference, those small shifts. I think we’re probably also likely to see, and we saw some of this in the exit polling, a major shift in independent voters, unaffiliated voters, toward the Democrats, whereas in 2024 they had been closer to Trump. I’d like to go back to turnout briefly. Turnout looks like it was strong across the country. In Georgia, for example, Election Day’s turnout was on pace to beat turnout in the 2024 presidential elections. That’s unprecedented, at least in modern elections. In Texas, for example, in some counties we saw James Talarico getting as many raw votes as Kamala Harris did in a presidential election. This isn’t a very political science term, but that’s insane. In a midterm election you typically see 10% or 15% less turnout than you would in a presidential election. But Democrats voted in presidential-level numbers in a lot of these really key areas, and that’s explaining how they’re able to overperform at levels we haven’t seen in at least 20 years. Voters cast their ballots on Election Day at the Cross Insurance Center polling location on Nov. 3, 2026, in Bangor, Maine. Joe Raedle/Getty Images Elon Musk spent nearly half a billion dollars supporting Republican candidates, including some US$200 million in Texas to elect Ken Paxton for the Senate, who lost. What does that tell you about the influence of political spending? Republican PACs, super PACs and billionaire donors like Elon Musk may have raised more money compared to Democrats, but Democratic candidates themselves outraised Republican candidates through donors that gave directly to their campaigns. This is important for a couple of reasons. Number one, because candidates get much better rates on TV ad buys than outside spenders. And so they get more bang for their buck when they’re spending on advertisements, which is the most expensive component of any campaign. And more to the point, that is an indicator of sort of dedicated grassroots donors who turn into voters, whereas Musk gets one vote at the end of the day. And there is no amount of money that can make up for a really flawed candidate like Ken Paxton . And more to the point, a lot of this money, once you get into the tens, the hundreds of millions of dollars, a lot of the research talks about the diminishing returns that you get on that. Going from zero dollars spent to $10 million spent, that’s a very different kind of campaign. But once you go from $500 million to $510 million, that’s not going to get you a whole lot more votes. Any final thoughts? The territory that Democrats covered is unbelievable. The South Carolina Senate race went to Annie Andrews , the Democrat, which was unfathomable even a few months ago. Mississippi still appears to be somewhat in play. The blue wave turned into something approaching a tsunami. I think a lot of Democrats saw the polling and didn’t want to believe it or couldn’t bring themselves to believe it. But some of this late polling seems to have gotten things on the mark. What we’ve seen in these midterm elections is a massive rebuke of the last two years of the Trump administration, and a sort of blue wave of epic proportions toward the Democrats, the likes of which we haven’t seen in 20 or more years. It’s a huge confirmation of the approach that Democrats took in this election. Charlie Hunt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Democrat Abdul El-Sayed makes his case against Republican Mike Rogers in the Michigan Senate race, citing tariffs, gas prices, and healthcare as key campaign issues.