Opinion

On the eve of Donald Trump’s return to the presidency of the United States, in January 2025, Meta’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, announced that changes would be made to his company’s moderation policies in the name of “freedom of expression”, which, he said, was under threat by global pressures for what he saw as censorship. The announcement signaled a rapprochement between Meta and the far right around a common goal: the deregulation of Big Tech. Since then, growing entanglement between major technology companies and the U.S. President Donald Trump administration has shown how the private interests of a small group can override the public interest. In recent months, allegations have been mounting that Big Tech companies, especially Meta, have been interfering in the Brazilian electoral process this year, aiming to undermine the reelection of President Lula (PT). This kind of accusation is not new. Over the past decade, a vast body of literature has exposed the mediating role played by digital platforms in foreign interference in elections around the world . These reports have also highlight the challenges of holding companies accountable for allowing these interference campaigns to be amplified. At our research group, NetLab UFRJ , we have spent years investigating how major digital platforms shape public debate and influence people’s perceptions of reality, often outside the regulatory and normative frameworks in force in Brazil. Meta in particular has become fertile ground for disinformation and boosting fraudulent ads, which already account for 10% of its annual revenue . Despite lawsuits and administrative actions brought by Brazilian authorities against Meta, complaints and requests from civil society for investigations , as well as reports published by the press , the company has shown neither the willingness nor the diligence needed to effectively fight this kind of content. Given this troubling track record, NetLab UFRJ created the “Big Tech Observatory” during the 2026 election campaign period in order to monitor how Meta and other digital platforms performed in two key areas: algorithmic recommendation and political advertising. The initiative set out to examine whether these companies would comply with the current Brazilian legislation established by the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE). The results of the analyses, however, told a predictable story. We found that, between July and September, Meta received approximately R$ 2 million (US$ 400,000) for running 1,613 ads placed from outside Brazil that aimed to either favor or harm candidates. All were paid for in foreign currencies and boosted by pages with declared locations in other countries. The amount invested in this advertising is equivalent to that spent on prominent campaigns, including the race for Presidency and other executive offices. Brazilian electoral law expressly prohibits candidates from receiving cash or donations in-kind from abroad. This ban, however, did not prevent the ads from being displayed to Brazilian users of Meta’s platforms. According to the available information, not only the ads were allowed to circulate but they may have reached up to 171 million views in the country. But the irregularities in advertising do not stop there. Brazilian electoral rules prohibit electoral advertising from 48 hours before the polls to 24 hours afterwards. However, our analyses of both rounds of the 2026 election identified hundreds of ads in favor or against specific candidates that circulated on Meta’s platforms with no apparent restrictions. The company even allowed fake profiles posing as official channels of the Electoral Supreme Court to boost disinformation about a supposed “digital vote” which stated that people would be allowed to cast their vote from home on the day of the first round — something which does not exist in the Brazilian electoral system. In addition to these irregularities, Lula’s political campaign page was temporarily disabled by Meta without explanation, preventing it from running electoral ads. On September 23, his Worker´s Party (PT) reported they had been blocked from advertising on Meta’s platforms. In a statement released on October 16 , the company rejected the accusations of election interference and attributed the temporary deactivation to an “incorrect anti-fraud review” carried out under an agreement with the federal government to fight fraud involving public programs. The effectiveness of the company’s anti-fraud measures, however, is questionable: an analysis carried out by NetLab UFRJ identified hundreds of fraudulent ads involving federal public policies circulating before and after September 23, indicating that those same measures were not able to stop this kind of content from running during the same period. Finally, we found signs of discriminatory practices in ad pricing. Based on data released by Meta, we estimate that for the first round Lula’s campaign may have paid between 33% and 43% more than his far right adversary Flávio Bolsonaro campaign to reach the same number of users on Meta’s platforms. Despite this substantial difference, limitations in the company’s transparency policies make it impossible to identify precisely which parameters and criteria are used to price ads and, consequently, to draw definitive conclusions about the mechanisms behind this disparity. Even so, studies conducted in other contexts, such as the United States , India and the Netherlands , also point to evidence of discriminatory pricing practices in the platform’s advertising. Other complaints made during the elections add to this overall scenario of negligence and show that, despite being worth billions and their strategic position at the forefront of technological innovation, major digital platforms invest little in protecting their users. For example, this 2026 election in Brazil saw several controversies involving WhatsApp’s image generation service, powered by the Meta AI artificial intelligence. Users reported being able to generate content favorable to Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign without difficulty, whereas they were not getting the same results for Lula. Meanwhile, the documentary channel Revelando had videos criticizing Flávio Bolsonaro removed from its Instagram profiles shortly after they were posted, without clear justification from the company. These episodes cast doubt on the consistency of Meta’s moderation and content control systems, exposing failures that call for greater investment and improvement. The situation is made worse by the absence of transparent criteria or guarantees of equal treatment in how ads are handled, how content is recommended, how advertising is priced, and how profiles and posts are moderated. Big Tech companies have developed predatory business models , and they are currently joining forces with political forces committed to deregulation in Brazil . This is part of a strategy to protect their businesses and expand their room for maneuver. Whether or not one side of the electoral race is being deliberately favored, it is indisputable that the major digital platforms continuously exercise the power to determine what gains visibility and what remains on the margins, with no transparency over their criteria and no mechanism for accountability. What is clear is that, for these platforms, defending their economic interests and maximizing their profits prevails above user rights, public interest, and democracy itself. Os autores não prestam consultoria, trabalham, possuem ações ou recebem financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que se beneficiaria deste artigo e não revelaram qualquer vínculo relevante além de seus cargos acadêmicos.

Developing report via The Conversation: Justice, accountability, more questions: what Russell Brand’s guilty verdict means for victim-survivors. International and domestic agencies are assessing immediate developments across opinion sectors.

Iranians at a pro-regime rally in Tehran's Enqelab Square on Nov. 4, 2026, taunt U.S. President Donald Trump and his deputy, JD Vance. Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images While votes were still being counted in the U.S. midterm elections , administration figures in Washington were already inviting speculation over how the results might be connected to the conflict with Iran . On the morning after the election, Vice President JD Vance wrote on X that the major reason for the dramatic loss for Republicans was the American public’s opposition to the war. “Everyone knows why we lost. And any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there,” he wrote, in reference to the ongoing conflict that began with U.S.-Israeli airstrikes against Iran in late February 2026. While it is rare for a vice president to make such a critical proclamation about their own administration’s policy, President Donald Trump later stated that he did not disagree with Vance’s appraisal of the role that frustration with the Iran war played in voters’ minds. But whether this changes Trump’s view on next steps in the ongoing conflict remains unclear. Reporting over the past few weeks has indicated that the U.S. military has been actively preparing options and increasing capabilities in the Persian Gulf region in the event the president directs a resumption of hostilities. As an expert on Middle East affairs and a former senior official at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, I’m aware that months of conflict have failed to bring Iran to its knees, force regime change or militarily defeat a perceived threat to U.S. assets and allies. Escalating now is unlikely to change those realities – and it carries the additional risk of further damaging Republicans in the eyes of Americans voters as they turn toward the 2028 presidential race. Even if Trump were to ratchet up the conflict, moreover, it’s unclear how much wiggle room he’ll have come January facing a Democratic Congress almost uniformly opposed to the war . Demonstrators protest the Iran war near the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool on Nov. 2, 2026. Kevin Carter/Getty Images Sunk costs Part of the issue facing Iran war hawks in Washington now is that the conflict has caused serious setbacks for the regime in Tehran without satisfying the officially stated strategic reasons for going to war. They argue that pulling back now – as welcome as that might be for Americans struggling with the associated rising cost of fuel – may allow Iran to rebuild before the conflict is “won.” Moreover, it would render the military and reputational costs already sunk by Washington as wasted. Among the achievements of this war touted by the Trump administration has been the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khameini , along with the killing of scores of senior leaders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – including individuals like the former head of Iran’s National Security Council Ali Larijani . Significant elements of Iran’s air defense and radar network, ballistic missile and drone production, and storage and launch sites have also been destroyed. And Iran’s already outdated navy and air force has been further degraded. Meanwhile, the U.S.-imposed naval blockade against Iranian-linked shipping in the Persian Gulf cut off a crucial lifeline for Iran’s economy. And additional sanctions and economic penalties imposed by Washington have served to further devalue Iran’s currency and deprive Iran of additional financial links to the international banking system. Down but not out Yet for all the U.S. successes in degrading the Iranian military by limitless aerial bombardment and the significant financial pressure against the Iranian economy, an obvious endgame remains elusive. Despite weakening the Iranian government – now led by Ali Khameinei’s son, Mojtaba, and a new echelon of senior IRGC commanders – the Islamic Republic remains intact. Moreover, it still possesses enough ballistic missiles and drones to hold the region at risk, while continuing to impose significant control over its population . Meanwhile, U.S. military spending continues to rise. In September, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office assessed that the military costs of the Iran War had already totaled US$38 billion . Since then, that number has only increased . And that is to say nothing of the associated global economic costs that have resulted from Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a key shipping route for oil and gas. Should Trump decide to change course on Iran, he – and others – may think that the money, effort and lives of 19 American servicemen killed in the conflict would have been spent with no obvious objective achieved. Yet continued military expenditure with no strategic endgame could only magnify those same costs. The casket of Army Sgt. Angel Rampersad – one of 19 U.S. service members killed in the Iran war. Spencer Platt/Getty Images To Iran, the midterm results have not changed its public position. Mojtaba Khameini has issued statements directing the IRGC to widen the conflict in the region and perhaps beyond should the U.S. and Israel attack again. At the same time, a statement attributed to him indicates that hostilities between the United States and Iran will persist regardless of the balance of party political power in Washington. This raises questions about the prospects for diplomacy . During the summer, the U.S. and Iran agreed to an initial 14-point memorandum of understanding that, if finalized, could have brought a permanent end to the hostilities. But since the 60-day clock on that agreement lapsed , no parallel diplomatic agreement has emerged. No practical solution Even with the major shift in the U.S. political landscape, it remains unclear whether Trump will resume operations against Iran before the new Congress is sworn in. The messy election result in Israel – which has left the pro-war, and potentially outgoing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyanu with potentially more reason to double-down in Iran – only complicates matters. The U.S. military certainly appears to be ready to engage in a new round of attacks against Iran if so directed, and Iran is ready to retaliate. But given the shortcomings in the U.S. inventory – with munitions and missile and air defense capabilities depleted by eight months of war – escalation is something Trump and his inner circle will have to consider with caution. Iran might force the issue by engaging in asymmetric attacks in the region or beyond that they have not attempted already. Or it could launch a coordinated offensive with its partners in the region – notably the Houthis in Yemen, who have become more active in their own conflict with Saudi Arabia in recent months. But save an event that the Trump administration perceives is giving it cover to act, there are no clear indications emerging from Washington as to which way it will move. Vance diagnosed a widely perceived political problem for Republicans: Voters don’t want more war. But what he noticeably didn’t mention was a practical solution. The Middle East conflict – and the United States’ role in it – are, as such, locked in a stalemate. America and Iran have both borne significant political, military and economic costs. A decision not to pursue an endgame would leave those sunk; doing so may only increase them. Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Chris Hyde/Getty Images The Rugby League World Cup (RLWC) reaches its semi-finals this weekend, in a tournament that’s been marked by upsets , nail-biting finishes and some lopsided scorelines . On Saturday in Newcastle, New Zealand’s Kiwi Ferns face Fetu Samoa in the women’s competition, before the Kiwis take on an unbeaten Tonga. Sunday’s matches in Sydney see Australia’s Jillaroos meet Fiji, while their counterparts the Kangaroos face Samoa in a rematch of the previous RLWC men’s final. Pacific nations feature in all four semi-finals. But while the teams represent countries across the region, the vast majority of their players were born in Australia or New Zealand. Our analysis of the semi-final squads found 85% of the women and 95% of the men were born in these two countries. Many have also represented other nations during their international careers. These figures speak to the tight connections between Pacific countries, Australia and New Zealand – and the opportunities rugby league offers players with ties to more than one nation. Small populations, big ties By comparing squad profiles with population data, we can see how migration, family connections and population trends are reflected on the rugby league field. Population size is no guarantee of success in international rugby league. England and France, with populations of around 59 million and 66 million respectively, have already been eliminated. Yet Tonga, home to just 105,000 people, has reached the men’s semi-finals. The Cook Islands, with fewer than 15,000 residents, is the smallest country represented at the tournament. Although the Cook Islands is not in the semi-finals, seven players across the remaining squads have previously represented this proud nation, including Kiwi stars Charnze Nicoll-Klokstad and Apii Nicholls . Generations of migration across Te Moana Nui a Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean) and the Tasman Sea have created deep family ties between these countries. In the women’s semi-finals, 57% of players were born in Australia and another 28% in New Zealand. Twelve players across the Kiwi Ferns and Samoa squads have previously represented other countries, highlighting the overlapping national ties within Pacific rugby league. The Australia-Fiji semi-final, meanwhile, presents a different picture. Only one Jillaroos player in the final team list, Tiana Penitani Gray , has previously represented another country (Tonga), while none of Fiji’s players have done so. Club affiliations show a similar concentration in Australia: 86% of players across the four women’s semi-final squads compete in the National Rugby League Women’s Premiership (NRLW). They are based mostly with Australian clubs, though seven play with New Zealand’s Warriors Women. Fiji is the only team to draw heavily on players from outside the competition. A younger Pacific In the men’s semi-finals, 95% of players were born in Australia (50%) or New Zealand (45%). Seventeen players in the NZ-Tonga squads have previously represented another country, while just two players across the four men’s semi-final teams compete outside the National Rugby League (NRL). The strong presence of NRL and NRLW players also highlights the sporting opportunities available in Australia and New Zealand, and the increasingly diverse populations of both countries. We see such trends in wider migration patterns. In 2023, Australia and New Zealand recorded net migration gains, while Tonga, Samoa and Fiji experienced net losses. Another notable demographic trend is the relatively young populations of Pacific nations. As governments around the world prepare for ageing populations and growing demand for services and pensions, the Pacific remains comparatively youthful. That’s interestingly mirrored in the World Cup squads. In the women’s competition, New Zealand (median age 27 years) and Australia (26) have considerably older squads than Fiji and Samoa (both 22). The pattern is similar among the men, with New Zealand (29) and Australia (28) fielding older squads than Samoa (26) and Tonga (24). The differences are even more pronounced in the wider populations. The median ages of New Zealanders (37) and Australians (38) are much higher than those of people in Fiji (28), Tonga (21) and Samoa (20). Within New Zealand, we can point to a similar pattern. The median age of NZ Europeans is 42, compared with 29 for Fijian New Zealanders, 24 for Samoan New Zealanders and 22 for Tongan New Zealanders. These younger populations offer what we call a “ demographic dividend ”: the potential economic benefits as a growing share of the population enters its working and income-earning years. But these benefits aren’t automatic. Realising them requires investment in young people’s health, education and skills, as well as opportunities to develop their talents and aspirations. When talent meets opportunity Many players representing Pacific nations in this weekend’s semi-finals grew up a long way from the islands they now represent. They and their families were drawn to Australia and New Zealand by opportunities in education, employment and sport. Yet when the chance came, many chose to wear the jersey that reflects their identity, family ties and culture. Their achievements show what’s possible when young people have opportunities to develop their talents. Building on that momentum means continuing to invest in young people, on and off the field, so the next generation can thrive – wherever they call home. The authors acknowledge the contribution of Fiu Penjueli, senior statistician, Fiji Bureau of Statistics. The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Wildfire haze turns San Francisco orange, September 2020. hkalkan / shutterstock This year may be seen as a turning point in the climate crisis. The UN has accepted that global warming is going to exceed 1.5°C, while climate scientists have concluded that the rate of warming has effectively doubled over the past decade. What’s worse, the world may be approaching climate tipping points that could trigger further heating and catastrophic environmental change. Back in 2018, an international team led by Earth system scientist Will Steffen warned that continued greenhouse gas emissions and destruction of biodiversity could produce a cascade of warming that would culminate in the climate systems passing a threshold into a so-called “ Hothouse Earth ”. The engine of this cascade would be individual tipping points in the climate. For example, the shutdown of certain Atlantic Ocean currents would not just plunge Europe into freezing winters, but could significantly starve the Amazon rainforest of water vapour. A drought that turns the Amazon to savanna would have huge consequences for the global carbon cycle and climate system. Further warming would accelerate ice sheet loss and ramp up temperatures. As various tipping points are passed, the Earth system reaches a threshold that could produce a rise in temperatures greater than any for the past 1.2 million years. This would have devastating impacts on ecosystems and societies. Indeed, it’s hard to see how complex, industrialised civilisation would be able to exist in a world that has rapidly warmed beyond 4°C. Are we responding to the risks? To what extent the Earth system has the capacity to produce this sort of cascading warming is a topic of intense scientific research . We may be lucky, in that individual tipping elements such as Atlantic current collapse require much higher levels of warming , or more fundamentally the Earth’s current climate may prove to be more resilient than we think. Unfortunately, the opposite may be the case and a planetary threshold may lurk at lower levels of warming than Steffen and colleagues proposed. The Amazon rainforest may be approaching a tipping point. Manazir Khan / shutterstock It seems reasonable to assume that a deepening climate crisis will focus minds and spur climate action. Unfortunately, new research by my coauthors and I suggests the exact opposite may happen: the worse climate change gets, the harder it could be to stop it. The end point of that process is a disastrous acceleration towards further warming . Rather than being a purely theoretical exercise, we propose that we can begin to see signs of this slide away from climate action in the real world. For example, those nations most at risk from climate change can be caught in a sovereign debt “doom loop” whereby the damage caused by extreme weather reduces their abilities to repay loans and makes it harder to obtain desperately needed finance to both mitigate and adapt to climate change. This feedback loop can derail climate policy over time: as debt servicing consumes growing shares of government revenue, climate investments are sidelined, and the country becomes increasingly exposed to climate change. Increased warming can also increase conflict , thus undermining international cooperation required for mitigation. This is affected by a range of socioeconomic factors, such as inequality and political polarisation. For example, see the increase in popularity of Spain’s far right-wing and climate-denying Vox party following the devastating Valencia floods of 2024. While the floods were made much more likely because of human-caused climate change, Vox argued that it was left-wing “ideological” environmental policies that made people more vulnerable to the intense rainfall. The name we give to these dynamics is “ derailment risk ”, the situation where the consequences of climate change makes it harder to deal with the drivers of climate change, and so sustainability efforts end up being derailed. Planetary stewardship Given the potentially devastating consequences of a Hothouse Earth, it seems sensible to minimise the chances of it happening as much as possible. To that end, climate and Earth system scientists have argued that active management of this risk is required. This “planetary stewardship” goes beyond phasing out the burning of fossil fuels to include strengthening forests, peatlands and other natural stores of carbon, along with behavioural changes, technological innovations, new ways of governing, and transforming social values. But derailment risks could undermine the political and social conditions needed to establish any sort of planetary stewardship. How the planet could slide into a Hothouse Earth state. Steffen, Will, et al. , CC BY A key concept here is agency – the capacity to produce change. In the original hothouse framework, agency is essentially one way. Humans affect the Earth system by destabilising it. But humans are not simply an external force acting on the Earth system: we are part of it, and our social and political forces can influence its stability and whether the planet slides into a hothouse state. We argue that the feedback loops pulling us towards derailment can be stronger than those needed to establish planetary stewardship. That’s because collective action can be easier to destroy than build. At a psychological level, bad events affect people more strongly than good events. This is a factor in how trust within a society can be much easier to undermine than create. Increasing climate change impacts could therefore erode the social institutions needed to sustain effective mitigation and adaptation, just when they are most needed. To respond to this risk we propose a three-stage framework for assessing and managing derailment threats. First, identify and map feedback loops between the human and natural world; second, anticipate disruption and build resilience; third, develop active responsive governance strategies for periods of escalating instability. Humans are entirely responsible for the climate and ecological crisis, but we also hold the solutions. Maintaining our agency – the ability to put solutions into practice – may prove to be the keystone for all climate policies. James Dyke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Progressive Abdul El-Sayed’s victory in Michigan’s U.S. Senate race was one of the most-watched contests in the 2026 midterm elections. As the results for this race came in, I had my eye on one demographic: Black voters. I am a political scientist who studies Black political behavior. My research has been published in numerous journals , as well as in my forthcoming book, “Black Resilience,” which examines Black voters’ political participation. Wayne County voters The support of Black voters for El-Sayed was not a given. In the August primary, 62% of Detroit voters chose U.S. Rep. Haley Stevens over El-Sayed. Many pundits predicted it would be difficult for El-Sayed to gain support in Detroit, which is about 75% Black . After the primary, El-Sayed made overtures by sharing his plans to improve the lives of Black Americans, which included supporting the growth of minority-owned businesses, creating more affordable housing, eliminating food deserts and expanding the Rx Kids cash assistance program nationwide. About 91.8% of Detroit voters supported El-Sayed in the general election, according to the city’s unofficial results . Detroit City Clerk Janice Winfrey said 209,924 residents voted in the 2026 midterms , up about 21% from the 2022 midterm elections. For the 2024 presidential election, 247,770 city residents cast a ballot. In fact, El-Sayed received 70.6% of Wayne County votes , which includes Detroit. In 2024, Kamala Harris received 62.7% of the vote in Wayne County . Statewide support is holding steady In the 2024 presidential election, Michigan’s Democratic vote share fell to 48.3% , from 50.6% in 2020 , as the state went for Donald Trump instead of Democratic nominee Harris. Despite their ideological differences, Sen. Elissa Slotkin and El-Sayed drew similar support among Black voters. In 2024, Slotkin – a moderate Democrat – won 48.6% of the vote, a small margin over Mike Rogers, who was the Republican candidate in that race. In 2026, El-Sayed defeated Rogers statewide by a substantially wider margin, winning 52% of the vote. In other words, these early election results do not indicate whether Black voters embraced El-Sayed’s progressive platform or simply voted for the Democratic candidate. Voters may have been rejecting Republican Party politics or expressing anger toward Trump over pocketbook issues. Researchers from Michigan State University found that precincts with more than 80% of Black voters supported Democratic statewide candidates over Republicans at a rate of 92% to 94% during the 2024 general election, which is only slightly lower than the 94% to 95% levels observed in similar precincts during the 2020 contest between Trump and Joe Biden. Even while Black voters overwhelmingly support Democrats, small shifts in their support and turnout can influence the outcome of close and competitive races. These shifts may help explain differing outcomes, including El-Sayed’s victory in 2026 and Harris’ defeat there in 2024. While Black voter support for El-Sayed was high, estimated at around 86% statewide , Gov. Gretchen Whitmer’s support among Black voters was about 94% in the 2022 gubernatorial race, according to an ABC exit poll . Similarly, preelection polling indicated that Jocelyn Benson, the Democratic nominee for governor, polled more favorably among nonwhite voters compared to El-Sayed . NBC exit poll data shows that 86% of Black voters in Michigan supported El-Sayed, while 90% supported Benson , who won the governorship over Republican John James. Historic power and unity Black voters are often strategic voters who support the candidate they believe best aligns with Black interests, which has usually been the Democratic candidate since the Civil Rights Movement. Generally, Black voters have made their electoral choices based on what’s believed to be best for the group as a whole – a concept described by political scientist Michael C. Dawson as linked fate . However, recent research shows that Black social networks and institutions, including churches and civic organizations, reinforce expectations of political solidarity . Weaker ties to these networks may lessen the social pressure that encourages Black Americans to participate in politics and support Democratic candidates. Lower participation by Black Americans could lead to elected officials paying less attention to issues important to Black voters, such as affordability and the cost of living, healthcare, and reducing racial discrimination . If officials assume Black voters will remain loyal to Democrats, they’re under less pressure to win their votes by addressing their concerns. My research has demonstrated that after the 2024 election, Black women in particular felt frustrated with the Democratic Party, yet they participated in elections despite these frustrations. An agenda that matters El-Sayed was part of a field of notable Democratic candidates in this election cycle. For example, Angie Nixon, a state representative in Florida, championed affordability alongside a moratorium on evictions and a universal jobs program , while James Talarico, a former schoolteacher in Texas, focused on public education. El-Sayed is a former public health official who had not previously held elected office. This may have turned off some Black voters who often value governing experience . El-Sayed advocated for Medicare For All and lowering the costs of gas prices and groceries. Although he doesn’t identify as a democratic socialist, El-Sayed campaigned with several progressive elected officials, such as U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders endorsed El-Sayed on the day he announced his candidacy in 2025. El-Sayed also campaigned with the Black establishment, including U.S. Rep. Jim Clyburn of South Carolina. Former President Barack Obama spoke at a rally for El-Sayed in Detroit in October 2026. Stevens, who lost the Democratic nomination to El-Sayed in the primary, endorsed Republican Mike Rogers after she attended a service with the Republican candidate at a predominantly Black church in Detroit two days before the election . Stevens’ tactic drew severe backlash from Democratic leaders and may have mobilized some Black voters to turn out for El-Sayed on Election Day. “I felt like she pimped my community,” one Black voter from Detroit told ABC News in response to Stevens’ last-minute endorsement of Rogers. Christine Slaughter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images New Zealand First leader Winston Peters – a veteran of 18 general elections – has called this long and sometimes fractious campaign “the worst of my career, easily”. But whether you agree with him or not, tomorrow night still promises exciting live entertainment. Will Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and his three-party coalition be removed from office after just one term? Will they be replaced by a left-wing coalition led by Labour’s Chris Hipkins – the same man who lost to Luxon in 2023? Will the Opportunity Party make it over the 5% threshold for seats in parliament, potentially holding the balance of power? More technically, will the various campaigns to have voters split their two available votes (one for their electorate candidate, one for their preferred party) have a bearing on the result? Normally in New Zealand’s mixed member proportional ( MMP ) system, the election numbers that really count are the party-vote percentages. This time, however, individual electorates will matter more than usual. With polls promising a very tight race, here are some numbers and possible scenarios to track on the night. Overhangs on the left or right A parliamentary overhang happens when a party wins more local electorate seats than it would have been awarded in proportion with its percentage of the party vote. The overhang seats are added (above parliament’s normal 120) to accommodate those extra winners of single-member districts. Overhangs of one to three seats have occurred before. But this election campaign has seen organised efforts on both the left and right to deliberately use the overhang rule to increase the number of seats their respective sides can win. Te Pāti Māori is ignoring the party vote entirely and asking supporters to deliver wins in the Māori electorates but give their party vote to Labour or the Greens (which would increase the overall party vote on the left). Winning three to five Māori electorates would greatly outweigh Te Pāti Māori’s party vote entitlement, which could go below 1%. The number of overhang seats produced on the left will be a major talking point on the night. A counter-strategy on the right (not officially endorsed by the National Party) assumes National can win more electorates than its party vote (possibly below 30%) would warrant. The campaign is asking right-wing voters to keep the left-wing parties out of office by party-voting ACT or New Zealand First, and giving electorate votes to the National candidates. By some calculations , if that works, it significantly increases the odds of a right-coalition victory. Read more: Election Policy Tracker: your guide to what the parties are promising during the 2026 election campaign Tactical voting and skewed results It’s impossible to predict how many voters will heed the calls for tactical vote splitting. In the 2023 election , 35.51% of voters split their votes, compared to 27.33% in 2020. National voters were the least likely to do so. Nonetheless, the overall impact of these opposing strategies to maximise the overhang could increase the size of the next parliament and alter the balance of power. On the night, watch the numbers of electorate seats won by National and Te Pāti Māori. In 2023, National won 44 electorates and 38.1% of the party vote. Five MPs from the party list then made up its proportional share of seats. If National’s party vote falls to around 30% this time, we’d normally expect its number of electorate seats to fall, too – maybe below 30. But if ACT and New Zealand First voters do split their votes, National could win more local electorate seats than the party vote would normally deliver overall. If National wins 29% of the party vote, for example, that would normally entitle it to 35 seats. Predictions are hazardous, but National could conservatively win 39 or more electorates. One peculiar outcome could be that Labour gets a higher party vote than National, but National wins more seats than Labour. That’s the kind of disproportionate outcome that brought the old first-past-the-post system into disrepute after the 1978 and 1981 elections. Balance of power? Opportunity Party leader Qiulae Wong visits parliament before the election. Marty Melville/AFP via Getty Images Opportunity and uncertainty The next number to watch is the Opportunity Party’s party-vote percentage. Polls indicate it will make it over the 5% threshold for seats in parliament for the first time. That’s no guarantee – polls are often wrong. But if it does, Opportunity could hold the balance of power after the election. The party’s stated inability to work with New Zealand First (especially after the Michael Laws fiasco ) could significantly affect coalition negotiations. The combined party votes of National and Labour will be another key factor. Since the MMP system began in 1996, that number hasn’t gone below 62%. The lowest was 62.03% in 1996, and the highest was 81.3% in 2017. Going by opinion polls, that sum may go below 60% this time – the flip side being that smaller parties stand to gain. In 2023 , the Greens won 11.6% of the party vote, ACT 8.6% and NZ First 6.1%. If the polls are more or less correct, all three will get a boost. This, too, could be aided by tactical vote splitting. Be ready to wait for a result And we mustn’t forget election-night numbers are only provisional. There are still special votes to count, and there were over 600,000 of those in 2023. In recent elections, the Greens and Labour have picked up one or two seats between election night and the final count, at the expense of National. And electorate cliffhangers can be important, too, including maybe one or two Māori seats. Small shifts in seat numbers over the following three weeks could affect prospects for government formation. The final tally takes three weeks , with coalition negotiations between the parties potentially taking several more. The race isn’t truly won until the governor general swears in a new administration – maybe by Christmas, maybe later. Although the party that wins the largest percentage of the party vote is normally in pole position to form the next government, that doesn’t necessarily mean they’ll succeed in doing so. As I write, no one even knows exactly how many seats there will be in parliament – but everything will depend on which workable coalition holds a majority of them. The leader of the party that comes second may not concede defeat on the night. There may still be everything to play for. Grant Duncan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The US midterm elections have shifted the balance of power in Congress, delivering a massive blow to Donald Trump and his Republican party. This has implications both at home and possibly abroad, including for US policy towards Ukraine; an issue that was hardly mentioned during the campaigns. But even if Ukraine did not figure much in the election, the question in US politics of what to do about the war has not gone away. Indeed, in the weeks and months before the result was announced, Trump had been busily rowing back on US support for Ukraine. This was despite much opposition, even from some Republicans. Crucial intelligence to Kyiv about Russian strikes was cut off , before later being reinstated, while critical military aid was reduced. Trump also decided to suspend several sanctions on Russia. This move was denounced by President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine as only helping Russia, but justified by Trump as being “in the national interests of the United States” and also a decision that might help his party’s electoral chances by reducing gas prices. In the end, none of this helped Trump and the Republicans. Yet few commentators believe that the midterm results, disastrous though they have been for Trump, will have very much impact on his foreign policy outlook and his policy towards Ukraine in particular. “The Trump administration’s foreign policy is like a car going down the highway,” said James Green, a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform and former Congressional aide in Washington, recently. “Congress has the ability to slow that car down, maybe make it put on a turn signal, but it’s going to be very difficult for Congress to change the overall route over the next two years.” In part, this has to do with how foreign policy is determined in the US. Congress is not without some influence. It can hold hearings, subpoena executive branch officials, as well as exercise control over the purse. Yet as commander-in-chief and head of state with a vast foreign policy bureaucracy supporting him, the president retains significant foreign policy powers . The Democrats are also unlikely to make Ukraine front and centre after the midterms. They will have other more important fish to fry, the most critical being how to make sure they come up with a candidate and programme that will win them the White House in 2028. Yet Ukraine is a cause which many Democrats and quite a few Republicans have championed for some time. Nor are they likely to forget what ordinary Americans think about Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. The war in Ukraine may not be something they think about on a daily basis. On the other hand, as the Pew Research Center showed in 2025, 67% of Americans distrust Putin while six in ten view Russia as an enemy. Democrats may not wish to become embroiled in a European war. But having just scored a sweeping landslide victory, they may well calculate there is a good deal of political mileage to be had now in escalating their attack on a weakened Trump if his foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine continues in their view to reward an aggressor while making the victim of that aggression look like an obstacle to a settlement. Pushing for a peace deal? If the midterms result presents a series of opportunities for the Democrats, while posing a challenge to Trump, it also presents Putin with a possible opportunity. The Russian leader may well try and exploit Trump’s domestic position by offering some kind of settlement that would allow the US president to claim a victory. US, Chinese and Russian officials have already been holding talks about a summit when the heads of state travel to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit later in November. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has said Russia hopes to finalise the meeting in the coming days. Trump is similarly keen on such a meeting. He told reporters in October that Ukraine would be discussed at the meeting, adding : “I would meet in order – anything I can do to end the war, whether somebody is there or not, whatever I can do to end the war.” This might sound reasonable enough. However, deciding the fate of a sovereign country which won’t be at the negotiating table, and coming to some kind of “great power” deal with two authoritarian countries that involves Ukraine losing 20% of its territory, is almost certainly something an emboldened Democratic party in Congress will not take lying down. Nor, according to most military experts, would it be wise to concede anything to Russia when its war against Ukraine appears to have run into the ground. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia may have “secured a temporary advantage in the skies over Ukraine through their jet-powered drones and the shortage of Patriot missiles that can intercept their ballistic missiles”. But as the institute also points out, unless western military aid dries up entirely, a Russian victory is by no means inevitable. A war that most experts, including the CIA, predicted would be over in a matter of months is thus likely to go on. Trump is unlikely to change his mind about Russia and Ukraine. Russia in his mind’s eye will continue to be regarded as a potential partner, and Ukraine a country that has taken assistance from the US and given “absolutely nothing back except grief”. But now, with his back to the wall politically and the Democrats in charge of Congress in a country that has just passed a decisive verdict on his presidency, shaping his own agenda in relation to Russia and Ukraine is likely to prove more difficult. Michael Cox was a founding director of LSE IDEAS and is an associate fellow at Chatham House.